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The lessons are there to be learned from the recent closing of
NYUonline, New York University?s for-profit distance-learning
subsidiary, but most are sure to be missed. With the demise of the
company, traditional academics have proclaimed victory over their
corporate-minded rivals in the ever-escalating battle for the soul of
the university. However, this is a simplistic and self-serving
conclusion that, with the level of commercialism permeating academe, is
clearly not the case.
NYUonline was created in October 1998 amid great fanfare and with a
$21.5 million investment by the NYU board of trustees. The company was
organized as a for-profit subsidiary and was managed for the first year
by NYU administrators. In January 2000, the NYUonline board of
directors began hiring a team of experienced business executives to run
the subsidiary. This group managed the company ? which was often
referred to internally as NYU?s 15th school ? until the
funding ran dry in October 2001 and the university?s board of trustees
decided against reinvesting. The company was formally shut down several
weeks ago.
What are the lessons those claiming victory?e.g., defenders of the
traditional academy, opponents of online education, adversaries of
capitalism?will take away in the aftermath of NYUonline?
1.  
The for-profit corporation, particularly in the form of a subsidiary organization, doesn?t ?fit? in the
university.
Many believe that NYUonline was a visible triumph of the culture and
values of the collegial academy over the for-profit corporation.
However, the data are not yet in. Even though it seems that NYUonline?s
culture was not congruent with the larger culture of the university,
and though there are indications that this may have contributed to the
difficulties NYUonline faced, it is not clear whether this was the
cause of the company?s dissolution. NYUonline seemed to be caught in a
crippling concatenation of events. As the economy cooled, corporations
became much more frugal in their spending on employee training, the
subsidiary?s lifeblood, and then, just as funding ran out, the events
of September 11th devastated lower Manhattan. Two weeks
later, with the dust literally still settling, the board met to decide
the company?s fate. Many would like to believe that this was all about
a mismatch of cultures and purpose, but as of yet, there is no hard
evidence to support that conclusion.
2.  
Universities will cease to establish for-profit subsidiaries.
True, the excitement has waned, but the for-profit subsidiary is not
dead. When the economy thaws and reheats, there is no reason why a
number of these subsidiaries won?t sprout up again. Even as late as
2001, George Washington University created a for-profit subsidiary, GW
Solutions, from its continuing education department. UCLA created a
subsidiary of its School of Theater, Film and Television at the same
time. As intellectual property policies continue to be crafted to allow
institutions greater control of course content, the potential for added
revenue from a for-profit subsidiary would seem to be too great for
trustees and administrators to ignore for long.
3. There is no market for education and training delivered by for-profit subsidiaries.
Just as many of the current subsidiaries were being created?by Duke,
Columbia, Cornell, and NYU?the Internet economy was failing and the
easy riches that were once seemingly everywhere for the taking were
quickly disappearing. Unfortunately, the economy has since continued
its downward trajectory, but to say that there is no market for online
education and its permutations delivered by for-profit subsidiaries is
a major mistake. In fact, the market seems to be growing, maybe even
due to the poor economy. About 2 million students take online courses
in the U.S.; by 2006, this number is projected to grow to 5 million. Of
course, internationally, the potential student audience is much larger.
To meet this demand and opportunity, even in times of austerity for
many institutions, spending on e-learning technology is estimated to
double by 2005.
Time will judge the truth of these lessons, yet no matter how valid,
Time will judge the truth of these lessons, yet no matter how valid,
they seem to miss what NYUonline really means for higher education.
Another look at the subsidiary reveals a different set of conclusions
with potentially far greater import for the academy.
1.  
The creation and now subsequent closing of NYUonline sharply illustrate how business-like
universities really are.
NYUonline was only a failure for NYU. For the rest of higher education,
the company?s birth and death confirmed that it is possible, and, in
better economic times, still potentially profitable, to create a
legally structured corporate entity within the aegis of the university.
Unlike academic departments, a subsidiary can access financial markets,
partner efficiently with other companies, attract talent from the
business world, and operate completely outside the traditional
structures of shared governance. Most importantly, NYUonline shows that
these subsidiaries, unlike an academic unit or program, can be closed
with little difficulty or controversy. With retrenchment and
cost-cutting on the horizon for many institutions, this operational
ease is what every administrator yearns for. There were no tortured
deliberations by academic committees, no tenured faculty that could not
be relocated or let go, and no student protests to endure. The decision
was simply made and then executed. Surely alert presidents and their
staffs did not miss this fact.
2.  
With NYUonline, the role of faculty and their relationship to the
university changed dramatically and will continue to be redefined in
the future.
Moving beyond the part-time and adjunct instructor model that has
proliferated in academic departments, NYUonline contracted with faculty
as ?content providers? to create course products. Faculty essentially
became vendors who sold their wares?syllabi, subject knowledge, and
pedagogical expertise ? to NYUonline, in the same way that freelance
computer programmers were hired to write code for the company?s
technology platform. The professor?s traditional job was unbundled,
with the compilation of materials, course writing, and technical design
accomplished by freelance consultants/academics. An individual
professor, at the outset, provided the overall course design, and at
the process?s conclusion, gave final approval to the finished product,
but, most importantly, the professor was paid to put his or her ?brand
name,? along with NYU?s, on the course, which added prestige and
provided a signal of quality. Faculty?s traditional ?do-it-all? role
was thus reduced to a supplier of raw course material and a provider of
packaging pizzazz. Of course, some faculty entrepreneurs may like the
idea of delivering the goods, either in content and/or presentation,
without worrying about the details. These faculty thus make money doing
what they do best, and in effect, outsource other functions.
The redefining of the faculty role underscores a growing tendency
toward isolating major institutional decisions from the faculty?e.g.,
athletic contracts, commercial partnerships, corporate sponsorships. As
faculty become non-participants in strategic decision-making and
investing, power and money will continue to shift from the core
teaching and learning mission of most institutions to revenue
generating activities established on the periphery. This tendency
foreshadows the next lesson.
3. NYU demonstrated that significant amounts of money can be used in
experimental internal ventures, and be considered solely as investments
seeking a favorable return, thus avoiding the approval or even comment
of faculty.
Trustees control what are often very substantial endowments, which for
the good of the institution have to be dealt with in a ?business-like?
manner. Because of this, in the boardroom at least, business principles
reign. These principles are given fertile soil in the ?loosely coupled?
academy where the creation of experimental business units, like
for-profit subsidiaries, is facilitated by relatively few regulations,
a lack of coordination and interdependence between units, infrequent
inspection, and a broad sense of institutional mission and purpose.
Moreover, the NYU trustees who oversaw NYUonline do this type of
transaction all the time in their work lives, do it without remorse
when it doesn?t turn out, and then quickly look ahead to the next
opportunity where the returns will make up for past losses. When I sat
down to speak with a university president about his institution?s
for-profit subsidiary, his first question back to me was why I wasn?t
more interested in the company that they had formed to manage the
university?s endowment. ?That?s where the real action is,? he asserted.
As this president declared, it may be true that for-profit subsidiaries
are just a product of the real commercialism in the university.
Maybe these lessons are hard to see. I am convinced there are others
that haven?t yet been articulated but that will come to light soon
enough. Now that NYUonline has completed its life cycle, it provides a
ready case study. Early adopters always bear the brunt of the learning
curve, but often, even in failure, unlock the door of success to
others. Along with the dozen or so for-profit subsidiaries that were
created between 1998 and 2001, there were undoubtedly many other boards
of trustees and presidents mulling over the idea of spinning-off a
company in search of new revenues. To these intrepid souls, NYUonline
is a perfect specimen for dissection and analysis. As they identify the
cause of the company?s fatal malaise, they will feel better prepared to
undertake their own ventures.
When one considers what is happening every day in the business of
higher education, the failure of a single for-profit subsidiary, no
matter how visible, becomes less a sign of victory or defeat and more a
confirmation of a continuing trend. The business-like path higher
education is careening down is being followed by presidents and
administrators who are forced to operate in an environment that is
increasingly competitive. When joined by trustees, who are quite
comfortable maneuvering in competitive markets, a potent combination is
generated. Because of this, what is espoused as an institution driven
by mission and academic values is in reality an organization controlled
by the bottom-line?seat bottoms have to be filled. This imperative
motivates administrators to aggressively market their programs to
prospective students, continually cultivate donors to bolster the
endowment, assertively lobby government for added support, and actively
seek new sources of revenue. In this quest for revenues, administrators
and trustees are becoming increasingly entrepreneurial with the assets
and operations of the university. Course content becomes intellectual
property, student consumer behavior becomes ?pouring rights,?
?branding? becomes an institutional goal, research discoveries become
patent and licensing revenues, and ideas become companies.
Of course, all this is happening while trustees and administrators
continue to salivate over the skyrocketing market values of for-profit
education companies. As I write this, the University of Phoenix
Online?s stock is trading at $33.90 per share, up from its 52-week low
of $14.87. For the last fiscal year, the company?s profits were up 82
percent, to $32 million. Phoenix Online?s parent company, The Apollo
Group, reported earnings up 28.6 percent for the latest quarter, and
the best performer on the market, Career Education Corporation, has
seen its stock rise 257 percent since 1999. Overall,
The Chronicle of Higher Education?s
for-profit education index has significantly outpaced the S&P 500
over the past two years. Clearly there is a market for what for-profit
subsidiaries provide. Because of this, NYUonline is not the death of an
experiment but a testament to a trend.
Am I predicting the end of traditional higher education with the demise
of NYUonline? No. Yet after NYUonline, it seems clear that the academy
will never be the same. NYUonline showed that even in the academy, you
make money, lose money and move on. Universities are quite familiar
with the first two, but have never been able to move on very easily.
NYUonline demonstrated clearly how that can be done. It is a lesson to
which we had better pay close attention.
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